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WHAT THIS IS ABOUT, AND FOR WHICH FILES TO LOOK: Computer simulation, a technology well advanced in military strategies and tactics, has been used somewhat for response to natural disasters. The authors argue that it should also be applied to the field of humanitarian action in armed conflict. Projected uses are: the management and planning of relief actions, public resource mobilization for humanitarian actions, training personnel for violent work environments. This folder holds three files that let the reader see how that can happen and how he or she can become active in simulation personally. The text file SIM_RLIF.TXT is a paper discussing how the work environment of relief agencies has changed, and how the uses of computers are evolving in the agencies. It enumerates areas and users for simulations in the humanitarian world. Those who wish to read the paper in a more convenient form or to print it out with frames and graphics will find the Word for Windows 6.0 version in file SIM_RLIF.DOC. This file is also part, for downloading from Internet sites, of the compressed RLIF_ZIP.ZIP. How simulation works is demonstrated with the help of a model for estimating the effectiveness of protection and assistance for victims of armed conflict, inspired by the action of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Mali, West Africa. The file MALI.XLS is written in Excel for Windows 5.0; the sheets are so arranged that any user of Excel 5.0 can navigate a number of scenarios with the help of buttons, without bothering about the underlying mathematics. The basic model should be importable also into other spreadsheet applications such as Lotus 1-2-3 although some of the macros may not automatically translate. The context of the conflict, the Red Cross action, and the simulations are explained in the file MALI.DOC, a Word for Windows 6.0 document. For downloading, both MALI files are contained in the archive RLIF_ZIP.ZIP. You may wish to create a directory on your hard disk, such as "Relief", and copy the files there. This will improve speed while working in the spreadsheet. Depending on how fast your computer runs, recalculating a scenario should take between one and five seconds. Simulation follows the dictum of philosopher Karl Popper that it is better to let scientific hypotheses die rather than human beings. It seems particularly relevant in the fast changing relief world having to contend with pervasive situations of violence, little time to fathom out alternative courses of action under emergency pressures, and increasing use of computers also in the field. Our approach, however, favours personal and institutional creativity, use of existing equipment and applications, and tolerant styles of communication to share scenarios and insights. You can be the next person to experiment with simulations! The authors are grateful for comments, questions, your own experience, and references to related work. Aldo Benini & Janet Bradford, 170-C Brisco Road, Arroyo Grande CA 93420, USA, Phone and fax: (805) 481-6609, To leave a message: (805) 481-2135. e-mail: <abenini@slonet.org > .

************************************************************* Aldo Benini / Janet Bradford COMPUTER SIMULATION OF HUMANITARIAN SCENARIOS TOOLS FOR TRAINING AND FIELD MANAGEMENT IN RELIEF AGENCIES A discussion paper *************************************************************  Aldo A. Benini, Ph.D. & Janet K. Bradford 170-C Brisco Road Arroyo Grande CA 93420, USA Phone and fax: (805) 481-6609 To leave a message: (805) 481-2135 e-mail: abenini@slonet.org ************************************************************* TABLE OF CONTENTS: Summary War, humanitarian action, and computers Relief workers: Call for new professionalism The new humanitarian environment Technological advances in humanitarian action Decision-making in humanitarian organizations Computer simulation for humanitarian action Computers in relief agencies: Resource tracking Simulation at work Simulation and violence Simulations and ethical questions: Does respect for Humanitarian Law pay? A future for computer simulation? Areas for simulation Simulation and the cost of forgotten wars Simulation philosophies User perspective: "When do I need simulations? How can I use them?" Images and analysis About the authors ************************************************************* SUMMARY Computer simulation, a technology well advanced in military strategies and tactics, has been used somewhat for response to natural disasters. The authors argue that it should also be applied to the field of humanitarian action in armed conflict. Projected uses are: the management and planning of relief actions, public resource mobilization for humanitarian actions, training personnel for violent work environments. How that can happen is shown with the example of a real relief management problem in the Sudan. Simulation can be introduced in ways that are compatible with agencies' needs, communication styles and staff abilities. Several factors speak for it: Many agencies routinely use computers applications that are flexible enough for simulation to be added seamlessly. Simulation will help agencies to add the power of analysis to the power of images that prompt to give for humanitarian actions. And with violence and chaos continuing, simulation offers a technique around which to share expertise and training in new, networked partnerships.  WAR, HUMANITARIAN ACTION, AND COMPUTERS The Gulf War was the first modern war that the western media consumers were able to follow continuously in real time, thanks to the innovative TV reporting. The same conflict enriched popular mythology with images of aircraft-supported command-and-control mechanisms. While it is human beings on the frontline who kept fighting and dying, the war was apparently decided by technology operated from far away. That was possible because of the power of modern computers and telecommunications, and these had been developed for, and were owned by, the military. The subsequent relief action in Kurdistan was spearheaded again by superior military logistics. Humanitarian agencies are not concerned with winning a war. They care for its victims. Agencies do benefit, however, from the huge advances that information technology has also made in civilian society. Computers and telecommunications help them to adapt to turbulent new environments. This includes the post-Cold War violence likely to persist for a long time and requiring agencies to train their personnel for substantially changed work environments. *************************************************************  Inset: RELIEF WORKERS: CALL FOR NEW PROFESSIONALISM Speaking for a coalition of some 160 NGOs active in development and relief, Julia V. Taft, President, InterAction: "Comprehensive field training is no longer a luxury. To succeed in managing complex emergencies, it is absolutely critical to provide training for NGOs so that they can improve their overall response capacity and enhance professionalism. Toward this end, InterAction members are in the process of developing a series of standardized training curricula for both relief workers operating in complex emergencies and the home office staff supporting them." "Managing Chaos: The evolving role of NGOs", November 30, 1994 ************************************************************* THE NEW HUMANITARIAN ENVIRONMENT With the end of the Cold War, the former client states of the major powers have seen militarized conflicts explode. Wars have multiplied; they are large-scale disasters for the societies that they engulf. The Balkans, Caucasus, and Angola have been in the throngs of big wars, but human suffering is huge also in the large number of countries whose poor economies and social fabric are further wrecked by low-intensity armed conflicts. Rwanda gives an example of such a conflict that, with seemingly no prior warning, turned into mass killing of apocalyptic dimensions. The international community has addressed the problem. Peace-making has known success (Cambodia, Mozambique) but has become mired in other countries (Somalia, Haiti, Angola, Bosnia), thus strengthening those who favor isolationism and retreat from chronic conflicts. Ironically, while the media revolution, as part of the global transformation, has helped focus attention on the needs of war victims in poor countries, it has also solidified images of societies beyond repair. For international humanitarian action, an entirely new situation was created by the Gulf War and its immediate aftermath, the Shi'a and Kurd uprisings. Military threat was used in order for relief to reach the victims denied it. The traditional humanitarian agenda was again dramatically changed in Somalia, where relief agencies found they had to feed an entire nation (including the militias that were destroying it), and in ex-Yugoslavia, where over two million displaced persons are being maintained in or near the war zones, preventing them from spilling over to central Europe. Associating the distribution of relief supplies with the potential for military actions has placed even more pressure on humanitarian organizations. Already pledged to neutrality and impartiality through the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims, and pressured to compete among themselves for contributions and visibility, humanitarian organizations need to improve their professionalism. Moreover, the reform of the UN system calls for improved coordination of humanitarian action and for better early- warning mechanisms. Those factors will further expand use of technology including computers and communications networks to assist the relief community. ************************************************************* Inset: TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES IN HUMANITARIAN ACTION Telecommunications in the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) For the first time in 1963, the ICRC opened a radio link between HQ and field: simple amateur radios in a Geneva office and in a war hospital in Yemen were used for daily contacts. The 1967-70 Biafra War was the first war in which the ICRC HQ had daily radio contact with its delegations on both sides. In 1990, the ICRC started using satellite links. Three years later, the annual volume that its HQ Central Dispatch handled with 50 field delegations had grown to 250.000 messages. The ICRC is currently using 1250 HF and 2300 VHF radio sets worldwide, linked by 80 satellite stations. (Source: ICRC, Dec. 1993). The extensive network is used not only to keep aid teams abreast of "what's going on the other side of the frontline" and to coordinate supplies for them; without it, the humanitarian diplomacy of the Red Cross would be unthinkable. ************************************************************* DECISION-MAKING IN HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS Relief / refugee management is a growing international field. It is evolving in a emergency perspective, subject to forces that have shaped disaster management in technologically more advanced settings and in the richer societies. Under media pressure, with priority attention given televised disasters, decision-making has become more rapid also in humanitarian agencies. They have learned active management of public perceptions. Technological advances have been essential to the growth of recent humanitarian operations. Modular, ready-to-work technology such as for rehabilitating the water supplies to major cities, has made relief agencies effective for tasks which a few decades back would have been beyond the reach of most of them. Communications is another leading factor (see inset). However, war creates also a number of inhibitions on decision-making that are less known to disaster managers in peace situations: extreme insecurity and uncertain access to victims. In fact, traditional sources of information (such as crop monitoring for early famine warning) relevant for disaster prediction and management are often among the first casualties of armed conflict. Faced with degrees of ignorance and uncertainty considerably higher than in many types of natural disasters, decision-makers in humanitarian organizations usually have to pursue just one major scenario. Agencies do take time for a needs assessment before fielding relief, but pressed by the threat to the lives of war victims and by the media to tell what the action is going to be, the scope for considering alternative courses of action is often small. Many alternatives come up because of information compiled and analyzed, at one point or the other, with the help of computers. In fact, the use of computers in humanitarian organizations has expanded beyond applications that enhance individual user productivity. Resource tracking as well as sharing information that is critical for early warning and intervention are increasingly done through networks. For example, the Emergency Preparedness Information Exchange [EPIX], based at Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, is an important node on the Internet for information exchange in the disaster relief community. COMPUTER SIMULATION FOR HUMANITARIAN ACTION There are, however, different degrees of computer use for explicit scenario- creation. This technique has existed longer and is more common in organizations that deal with natural disasters. In this field, advances in computer simulation have been tightly linked to Geographical Information Systems (GIS). Several domestic and international organizations use GIS for different purposes. For example, relief centers following the Northridge Earthquake were established using GIS to model damaged areas. Programs exist to model hazardous materials plumes. In agencies that assist victims of armed conflict, simulations and computers have rarely been used together. The only application that we know in regular use is the budget methodology of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Its calculations of a staffing plan or relief volume take into account also a cost for statistically weighted contingencies such as accidents. As the decision-makers consider different program alternatives, the application figures out their likely cost consequences. ************************************************************* Inset: COMPUTERS IN RELIEF AGENCIES: RESOURCE TRACKING The Emergency Information System (EIS) is used by several governments in the United States and internationally, to catalog and track resources. Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA) used a computer database to track donations, shipments, and distribution of goods shipped to Rwanda. This system is an evolution of one initiated by the US State Department's Agency for International Development. Another system has been developed and used by the Pan-American Health Organization. It started with a volunteer from the Colombian Red Cross, and has spread through South America. Using a database and standardized terms and formats, input can be accomplished from several sectors, using laptop computers and consolidated via modem periodically. By giving users simulation tools, the utility of computers can be expanded. ************************************************************* In other areas, progress is slower. The medical profession does have epidemics forecasting expertise, but we are not aware of its being integrated into relief action. In fact, when we visited the World Health Organization, we were told that the emergency information projects could advance only after harmonizing different platforms. In the pedagogical field, the Norwegian Red Cross is developing an interactive game "Human Quest" "to explain the work and values of the Red Cross movement in conflict areas". Famine forecasting development is a collaborative effort of the UN Food and Agricultural Organization, charities such as Save The Children Fund and universities: this has grown out of systematic food monitoring in vulnerable countries, chiefly in the Sahelian region of Africa. US-AID has funded its own Famine Early Warning System (FEWS). For those phenomena, computer simulation is helped by the fact that the underlying rules are relatively well known. While other aspects of humanitarian concern may seem defyingly complex, we contend that computer simulation in humanitarian action can have greater scope. Practitioners have considerable knowledge of cause/effect relationships in human suffering and in the means to reduce it; in addition, they often "deal with lower levels of the political pyramid and they focus on bringing indigenous people together" (Julia Taft) who know the local workings of the conflict well. Through dialogue, imagination, and use of widely accessible tools, that knowledge can be translated into valid computer simulations. This helps to create a sharper sense of alternatives; also it can shed light on the effectiveness of humanitarian action: How many lives are we saving? How effectively does our work help to reduce violence? An example of how that happens is therefore in place. SIMULATION AT WORK During summer 1990, local churches in Wau, a besieged town in southern Sudan, received airlifted food for relief. The donor agency (whose East Africa representative was not allowed to fly to Wau), apparently under the impression that the war had caused a general, acute famine, instructed that the entire relief food stock must be distributed immediately. The radioed instruction did not suggest any alternative nor ask for discussion. At the time, however, only ca. 10-20% of the population were unable to meet their needs in the market or through relatives. If carried out, this policy would not only have removed incentives for traders and farmers still supplying the market, it would also have eliminated food needed for the vulnerable groups later on. One of us (Benini, then in Wau) helped the local relief committee make representation in favor of stock building and gradual distributions. The committee's memorandum carried five scenarios, different in food arrivals and distribution strategies, simulated on the computer. The appeal was successful. However, when the committee used its autonomy for practical distributions, they initially planned them out in terms of truck trips to the four centers for displaced persons in town. The crudeness of the measure opened the committee to charges that people of different ethnic background were treated differently or, worse, that the balance left on the truck at the end of the day was stolen by some of its members. The committee then receded into a one-day workshop on distribution methods with the Red Cross, simulating loads and rations - this time with pencil and paper so that every member could practise the calculations. One of the simulation outcomes was the creation of simple forms to adequately plan and keep track of distributions. SIMULATION AND VIOLENCE Whether used for food management or for some other humanitarian activity, simulation helps our understanding of cause/effect relationships in human suffering and of the means to reduce it. One topic of prime importance in armed conflict is the spread of violence and the ways by which humanitarian action reduces it or mitigates its effects. These phenomena can in principle be simulated using epidemiological models, treating violence akin to a spreading disease. The models then tie in effects of humanitarian activity mixes in order to produce estimates of excess mortality (by violence, famine, or disease) avoided under varied scenarios. For example, in the conflict that opposed the government army and Tuareg rebels in Mali between 1991 and 1993, violence was manifestly sustained by two different, yet interrelated forces: retaliation for massacres of civilians along ethnic lines, and the devastation of the economy with its incentives to procure food by violent means. The action of the Red Cross and of NGOs working in the region was aimed to work on both mechanisms: a protective presence to help the leadership on both sides enforce respect for non- combatants, and politically balanced food distributions for hungry civilians. In a model fine-tuned to the conditions of the district with the worst violence in 1991, we simulated how effectively different strategies for mixing protection and assistance contributed to reducing violence. Some of the outcomes were surprising: delays in fielding food relief were less devastating than commonly assumed; however, if the relief was given only for a short period of time, its contribution to violence reduction remained marginal; a coherent and consistent delivery of both protection and assistance produced the best results even when budget and desert terrain limits restricted the humanitarian presence to part of the district area. Similar models can be made of other conflicts and humanitarian actions once local dynamics are understood to a minimal degree by the relief workers. Despite the apparent pervasiveness of conflicts, the underlying rules that link violence and relief need to be assessed individually for each theater, by persons working inside. Violence-related simulations therefore promise to be valid and useful, particularly in the middle and late stages of humanitarian interventions, after initial assessments have been done and aid workers have formed a tolerably reliable image of their work environment. Simulations may look into the spread of violence, the demography and mobility of victims, the effectiveness of interventions. Also moral issues that deal with categorical norms such as the respect for life and dignity can be addressed, considering varying degrees of compliance and local interpretations. ************************************************************* SIMULATIONS AND ETHICAL QUESTIONS: DOES RESPECT FOR HUMANITARIAN LAW PAY? Nations regulate the conduct of hostilities by different means. Besides the dictates of military codes and of public opinion, explicit legal norms that place restraint on the choice of means and targets in warfare have been important for more than a century. Many are incorporated in the Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims adopted in 1949. The Conventions, which most current states have signed, oblige belligerents to respect the lives and dignity of civilians and disable dcombatants also in war times. Particularly in internal conflicts, with their intense hate between opposed groups, civilians often become victims of violence, a behaviour justified with the argument that the other side is guilty of crimes even worse. Army unit commanders who wish to enforce respect for all civilians risk to be contradicted by their own troops as well as by civilians who have suffered atrocities and demand revenge. Respecting non-combatants is an ethical imperative, followed or not on a categorical basis and scarcely open to quantitative reasoning. Yet, compliance may be partial, and its consequences can be measured. In our simulation of armed conflict along ethnic lines in Mali, violence was generated by famine pressure and by past violence through cycles of tension. We calculated the amount of actual violence versus maximum possible violence against civilians over the period of one year. In one scenario, army and rebel commanders did not try to restrain their troops from attacking civilians of the opposed ethnic group. In the second scenario, the commander of the government forces in Goundam district succeeds in protecting the Tuareg civilians, though incompletely. His orders are respected when his troops operate near the district center; they continue massacres in the outlying areas. Tuareg commanders, in this scenario, do not impose restraint. Despite this very limited respect for humanitarian norms, the outcomes of the two scenarios are strikingly different. As ne may expect, violence against Tuareg decreases massively. Surprisingly, the Tuareg respond by decreasing their attacks on black villagers by almost the same amount. The absence of massacres against the Tuareg around the center cools tensions to a degree noticeable by fewer retaliatory attacks in other parts as well. Simulation can thus be used to elucidate ethical questions. While humanitarian norms remain categorial, there obviously are pragmatic arguments for their respect. *************************************************************  A FUTURE FOR COMPUTER SIMULATION? AREAS FOR SIMULATION Also in the years to come a large part of all international relief will be needed for victims of armed conflict or for those of natural disasters compounded by conflict. At the same time, development, disaster and conflict are increasingly being seen to lie in a continuum. Agencies who professionalize their operations and their staff for that scenario may want to build stronger mechanisms for coping with violence for several of their needs: 1. Resources for humanitarian intervention do not come forth automatically. Agencies mobilize them by actively building the case. People look at images of violence and of healing around which relief coordination, humanitarian mobilization and eventually conflict resolution can be organized. Images need interpretation - explaining the What, How and Why of the human condition. 2. In the management of a particular disaster, resources need to be used effectively and efficiently for the reduction of human suffering. For that, participants project the future of the disaster, feasible action and likely impact. Discussion inside agencies, as well as for the coordination, benefits from explicit statements of cause and effect, time and space. Computer simulation helps to reduce the complexity to manageable formats and to present alternatives powerfully. 3. In the training of relief workers, particularly for long-time and senior staff frequently moved to new countries, better conceptual tools are needed to understand how violence propagates, is contained, is mitigated by humanitarian action. Many agencies have strong traditions in fielding medical and material relief; they will want to make their workers more familiar with issues of protection and human rights the respect of which is a precondition for effective relief. ************************************************************* SIMULATION AND THE COST OF FORGOTTEN WARS Simulation can be used for preventive diplomacy: calculating the cost of programs that help stabilize a precarious peace vs. the cost of humanitarian interventions when a foreseeable disaster is allowed to happen. Afghanistan, cursed with one of the "forgotten wars", illustrates the case. Relief agencies complain that governments invest little in the huge reconstruction needs. Governments, wary of giving in a country that is at war with itself, point out that their means are used for emergency aid in the few accessible areas. The U.S. alone gave over $ 45 million to Afghanistan emergency programs in the past two years. Yet, half of the country is at peace and accessible through local administrations. For $ 45 million, a long list of projects can be simulated of the kinds that NGOs commonly implemented in the liberated areas of the eighties. Even if only a modest number of rehabilitation projects are carried out, they will contribute to stabilizing the peaceful areas. Simulation does not falsely compare the cost of one life saved through, say, agricultural development vs. one saved by food relief; it can, however, visualize the cost and benefits of peace-keeping. As such, it should be used more aggressively in humanitarian communications. *************************************************************  SIMULATION PHILOSOPHIES It is important to explore simulation in ways that are compatible with an agency's persona and communication styles. The exploration can be led by simulation technology on the market or by members' existing needs and abilities. The market offers various software particularly convenient to program simulations. The high-end software driven approach is suitable for work areas with well-defined formats and large, reliable data. For example, the budgeting application of the International Committee of the Red Cross has been written in a programming language; for costing a proposed action, it uses rules derived from the financial results of some fifty operations worldwide. Such programs can be powerful and give a marketable advantage (the ICRC's budget fulfillment prized by donors), but they are often proprietary and depending on experts. An open, bottom-up, participatory approach may be feasible for other tasks and user groups. The point of departure is that the portable computer is a very universal tool for almost all levels of user sophistication. The transitions from the simple plan that someone draws with paper and pencil through the stand-alone application to network-processed documents are fluid and flexible in both directions. The computers relief agencies equip their field personnel with often come with standard software. For example, among the more common applications, spreadsheets are widely used, for such diverse tasks as accounting, address data bases, stock control. Spreadsheets have very low entry barriers for new users and go on at discretion to fairly advanced calculations and modeling, with strong built-in support for graphic presentations. For example. a field nurse keeping a diary of her visits to outposts, can link this information to a sheet from which predictions of evacuation needs can be abstracted. Beyond the basic equipment, therefore, nothing new is needed. In counterpart, simulation needs tolerant communication styles with people who wish to explore sometimes un-orthodox alternatives and are ready to explain the cause and effect relationships that they see operating in the agency and its environment. Senior managers have the most seasoned views of the conflict and of humanitarian options but may have the least time to sit down and share in thought experiments. Skill to capture expert opinion from local people, seniors and colleagues and its translation into models is essential, particularly where insecurity and urgent needs rule out extensive survey work. Where such tolerance is part of the organizational culture, the participatory approach, using existing equipment and talent, can elicit very different contributions. Together they improve our understanding of the humanitarian environment and mission, and thus help to make better decisions. ************************************************************* THE USER PERSPECTIVE: "WHEN DO I NEED SIMULATIONS? HOW CAN I USE THEM?" The policy maker: "I just returned from the trouble area...I know how desperately aid is needed, but how do I convince the skeptics that it will really help?" "A powerful presentation with specifics on different scenarios will carry weight." The funding agencies: "Where can we invest our limited funds so they will do the most good? What will best reduce violence over the long term?" "By using these simulations, we can study different patterns of support, to maximize our effectiveness." The experienced field worker: "I'm about to move on to my next assignment. I've learned so much about these people and this conflict -- How can I pass on this knowledge to my successor?" "I can develop my own simulations, based on my experience here, which will help orient my replacement." The new relief worker: "I'm committed and motivated, but I just got here, and this culture is so different -- how can I make the greatest contribution for peace in this land?" "Even though I'm new, I can learn from the expertise of those who came before me -- and still try out some of my own ideas." The trainer: "Our training program is so stagnant -- Isn't there a better way to help new workers learn the ropes, and convince seasoned veterans to try new ideas?" "These simulations are easy to use and to teach to others. They can see their own results of their actions." *************************************************************  IMAGES AND ANALYSIS Every humanitarian organization has a wealth of descriptions of humanitarian disaster and action situations. They form part of its organizational culture - past ones that guide today's planning, as well as the emergent ones with which its workers are struggling in their present missions. These images are shared with the supporting society - Red Cross parcels for POWs, U.S. Coast Guard vessels picking up Cuban raft people, Tokyo commuters helping poison gas victims; the powerful ones move public opinion, government and international agendas, and resources. Technology will further accelerate the multiplication and delivery of images of disasters and of responders. The absorption and analysis, and with them the quality of the response, seems to be less consistent. After the March 1995 Tokyo subway gas attack, the media in California were rash to comment that similar attacks in Los Angeles would do less harm because the city is more spread out than Tokyo. Computer simulations of gas plumes will easily find the atmospheric conditions that could destroy the new myths - by thought experiment. Participation in such thought experiments will also be enlarged. Computers and networks are facilitating new kinds of partnerships. Famine prediction is improved by collaborating aid agencies, universities and partners in the affected countries. Conflict and violence are also at institutional crossroads, with the military having their own strong expertise which the humanitarian organizations must evaluate carefully. For a short reflection on technology in conflict areas, the distress of people in the Sudan may give us pause again: The Nuba used to be a proud people living in the mountains of the central Sudan. The beauty of their lifestyle became famous through the work of photographers and ethnologists. Since 1989, however, the Nuba have been systematically killed, deported and enslaved by Arab militias. The tragedy has been reconstructed indirectly, through the accounts of deportees in other parts of the country and of relief and media workers who have had very limited access to the Nuba Mountains. People like the Nuba need political pressure that the aroused world opinion brings on their persecutors, as well as on-site protection and assistance. With technological progress in humanitarian organizations, teams of investigative journalists and relief workers will be able to rapidly exchange with their headquarters images on human-rights disasters, evaluation of possible relief routes, and strategies for negotiating with the local parties. While fieldworkers thus find it easier to form realistic expectations for their part in the total picture, the information that they supply will support international advocacy. At the same time, the parallel need to provide low- cost, readily accessible communications for the poor and oppressed will also be perceived more strongly. In much of rural Africa, disaster and development communications can be speeded up tremendously by telephony or HF radio - regardless of the changing presence of foreign agencies. Whatever the contours of future partnerships and the differential access to technology, humanitarian organizations will increasingly need to supply images together with analysis and interpretation using their inside knowledge of disasters. Computer simulation can help - when it strengthens compassion for the victims. No technological advances will ever substitute for the respect of human rights and, during armed conflict, of humanitarian norms. But simulation can help us, in the words of the philosopher Karl Popper, to let hypotheses rather than human beings die. ABOUT THE AUTHORS Aldo Benini His experience is in Third World rural development and, later, with armed conflict and its sequels, violence against non-combatants, refugees and famine. In order to demonstrate a point which may have been counterintuitive, he taught himself computer simulation on the spot when he was Red Cross team leader in a besieged town in the Sudan, and he has since produced simulated scenarios of humanitarian action elsewhere in Africa where he worked. He also served with the International Committee of the Red Cross in Afghanistan and Iraq. Janet Bradford has been involved with U.S. disaster management for the last seventeen years, currently as a Senior Emergency Management Coordinator for the State of California. She has served in operational roles during large disasters, including the Loma Prieta Earthquake (1989), Los Angeles Civil Disturbance (1992), Northridge Earth- quake (1994), and California floods (1995). She has been Planning, Operations and Logistics Chief, and has also headed special projects in applying technology to disasters. She uses this field experience to validate her ongoing responsibilities as Chief of Program Develop- ment and Research for the California Specialized Training Institute. Our research in humanitarian action and disaster management is accessible in these publications: 1994 Bradford, J. et al.: "Biological Hazards and Emergency Management", Oxford: Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, March 1993 Benini, A.: "Simulation of the Effectiveness of Protection and Assistance for Victims of Armed Conflict: An Example from Mali, West Africa", Oxford: Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, December 1991 Benini, A.: "Computer Simulation as a Means of Dialogue between Relief Agencies and Local Committees", London: Disasters, December 1986 Bradford, J. et al.: "Effective Computer Systems for Emergency Management", in: Marton, S. (ed.): "Terminal Disasters: Computer Applications in Emergency Management", Boulder, CO, University of Colorado - 8 - .